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DOES DYING HURT?

DOES DYING HURT? PHILODEMUS OF
GADARA, DE MORTE AND ASCLEPIADES OF
BITHYNIA*
Near the beginning of the surviving part of Book 4 of About Death (De morte),
the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara takes up an urgent question: does
it hurt to die? Epicureans believed that the soul is made of atoms and that death
entails the separation of soul from body; if sensations including pain arise from the
movement of atoms in the soul,1 does the movement of the soul when it separates
from the body in death cause pain? If it does, then death, like all painful experiences, will be something that a rational person will want to avoid, and the second
leg of the Epicurean ‘fourfold remedy’ or tetrapharmakos, ‘death is nothing to us’,
becomes wobbly if it does not break altogether.2 It has not been recognized that,
in his answer to this question, Philodemus draws on medical theories that we can
associate with his older contemporary Asclepiades of Bithynia. Reading the relevant
passages of De morte with these theories in mind clarifies Philodemus’ argument
and provides an insight into the intellectual milieu of Late Republican Rome.
There is nothing improbable in the suggestion that the philosopher Philodemus
knew and was influenced by the physician Asclepiades. Both were Greek intellectuals resident in Italy, with patrons in the Roman governing class. They were
either near-contemporaries or only a generation apart. Philodemus was certainly
well known at Rome by 55 B.C., when he figures in Cicero’s In Pisonem as a
client of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus; in fact, Philodemus addresses Piso in his
work On the Good King according to Homer and in one of his epigrams. It used
to be generally accepted that Asclepiades was active in Rome at about the same
time, since Pliny places him in ‘the age of Pompey’. Elizabeth Rawson, though,
has argued that Asclepiades must have been dead by 91 B.C., the dramatic date
of Cicero’s De oratore, in which Crassus appears to refer to him as though he
were no longer living.3 If we accept Rawson’s dating, then Philodemus will have
known of Asclepiades as a fellow Greek active at Rome in the generation before
his birth; if we believe Pliny, then they may well have met one another at Rome
or on the Bay of Naples. Asclepiades, also, was the kind of physician-philosopher
who would have appealed to Philodemus.4 The titles of works attributed to him
* I am grateful to Prof. Richard Janko and Dr. Ben Henry for much-needed advice as I began
work on Philodemus, and to an audience at Bryn Mawr College for questions and comments on
an oral version. Errors and misunderstandings are mine alone.
1
Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 63.
2
For the Epicurean ‘fourfold remedy’ (1. God should not concern us; 2. Death is nothing to
us; 3. What is good is easy to obtain; 4. What is bad is easily avoided) see Phld. Adv. Soph. (P
Herc. 1005) 5.9–13 Angeli and Epicurus, RS 1–4 with the commentary of C. Bailey, Epicurus:
The Extant Remains (Oxford, 1926).
3
E. Rawson, ‘The life and death of Asclepiades of Bithynia’, CQ 32 (1982), 358–70.
4
G. Harig, ‘Die philosophische Grundlagen des medizinischen Systems des Asklepiades von
Bithynien’, Philologus 127 (1983), 43–60.
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include a work on definitions and two commentaries on Hippocrates, and his medical theories, as we shall soon see, could be read with sympathy by an Epicurean.
I turn now to the text of Philodemus. Here with a change of one word (μ[έρη
for μ[όρια in line 9) are lines 6–24 of P Herc. 1050, col. 8, as they appear in
Benjamin Henry’s recent edition, followed by my translation of them.5 (I translate
π[λεῖον ἢ μ[υρίων, which seems tolerably certain, in line 20 and διε]σ̣[παρ]μένη
in line 17; for details, see Henry’s apparatus ad locc. and his n. 28 on p. 19):
Φήσομέν τε τὴν συμπάθιαν πρ[ὸς τὸ
σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ . [. . . . .
μετ̓ ὀχλήσεως αἰτία . [ . . . .]ς ἢ π[υ]κ[νούσ]ης ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μ[έρη τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων
ἢ διϊστανούσης, ἀλλ̓ οὐ φ[αμέ]ν̣ γε ἀδ[ύνατον λυθῆναί ποτ̓ αὐτὴν [ὀλίγ]ης τυχο[ῦσαν] ἑτεροιώσεως ἥτις [οὐ]κ ἄῤ̣ [ἐσ]τί τινος
ἀ]λγ[ηδό]νος α[ἰ]τία· λ[επ]τομερὴς γὰρ
οὖσ]α καὶ τελέως εὐκίν[ητος ἡ] ψ[υ]χὴ κα[ὶ
δι]ὰ τοῦτ̓ ἐκ μικροτάτ[ω]ν σ[υν]έστηκ[υῖα
καὶ λει]οτάτων καὶ περιφε[ρε]στά[τ]ων
. . .]σ̣[. . .]μένη καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο πολλὴν
ἀ]πορία[ν π]αρέ[χ]ουσα, πῶς οὐ[κ] ἐξίπταται λ[. . . . . . . . .]ων πόρων ἐν τῆι σα[ρκὶ π[ . . . . .]ημ[ . . . . .;] ἢ̣ [ἐ]κ τίνος [οὐ]κ ἂν

10

15

20

εἴπ[αιμ]ε[. . . . . . .]ο[.] αἰτία[ς . . . . .
τὴ[ν . . . . . . . . . . . . διά]κρισιν [ . . . ( . . ) δεδοίκα[ . . ν . . . . . . . . . ἄ]ποτετελεσμέ[ν . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (.) ] αμ [ . . . .
We shall assert the common suffering of the soul in relation to the body; even if for the
most part … with distress … cause …, as it either abnormally lumps together or separates
the parts of living creatures, still we say that it is impossible that this common suffering
should never be dissolved after undergoing a small transformation, which is not, to be
sure, the cause of any pain. For the soul, being fine-particled and completely mobile, and
accordingly composed of the smallest and smoothest and roundest particles, when it is
dispersed throughout the body and for this reason causing much difficulty, surely just flies
out through the pores in the flesh that are there ready for it in countless numbers. Or for
what reason should we not say … the separation … are afraid of … once it is completed?

Fear of death may take several forms. We may, for example, fear that dying will
bring with it transformation into another, less pleasant state, or that we will lose
the good things that we now have, or that by dying we will be deprived of goods
that we might have gained by living longer. Epicureans reject all of these notions
and have, for the most part, good arguments against each one. Here, however,
Philodemus is concerned with a fourth kind of fear that might be reasonable even
for someone who rejected those just mentioned: the fear, which he attributes to
an opponent (who may be the Stoic Apollophanes named in the previous column)
that the moment of dying may be accompanied by terrible pains (μετ̓ ἄκρων
ἀλγηδόνων … μετ̓ ὀχλήσεω[ς] ἀνυπερβ[λήτου) as the soul separates from the
5
W.B. Henry, Philodemus, On Death (Atlanta, 2009). I have not included in my transcription
of Henry’s text the sublinear asterisk that indicates a letter transcribed incorrectly in one of the
disegni; see Henry, xxxiii.
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body. In the section before us, he addresses this fear. He first grants that pain
affects both soul and body (lines 6–7). Then he suggests, quoting Epicurus’ description of the soul as a σῶμα λεπτομερές,6 that because the soul is made up of
especially small, round atoms, this co-affection or sympathy will not cause any
pain as the soul leaves the body. Finally, in lines 23–4 he seems to assert that
whatever discomfort there might be must end almost immediately, just as soon as
the soul is separated from the body. (Von Arnim’s suggestion ἀ]ποτετελεσμέ[νης
ἀναισθητήσομεν in line 24 is at least plausible, though far from certain, and has
influenced my interpretation of these fragmentary lines.)
The first and third of these assertions are firmly grounded in Epicurean doctrine.
Epicurus thought that body and soul suffered together: ‘Think it not unnatural’,
he wrote to a friend, ‘that when the flesh cries aloud, the soul cries too’.7 The
soul, moreover, possesses the chief responsibility for sensation because it creates
the power of sensation by communicating its motions to the body,8 but it retains
this quality only so long as it is enclosed in a body. Once the atoms of soul, both
those that resemble wind or heat and those that are even finer, are dispersed, both
body and soul cease to have sensation (Ep. Hdt. 63–7). Epicurus also endorsed
the belief that pain, yin to pleasure’s yang, could always be tolerated. Bodily pain,
he held, is either acute or chronic; acute pain can be endured because it is soon
over, and chronic pain is never so severe that it cannot be endured (RS 4). Any
pain that accompanies death, Philodemus wants us to believe, must be not only
tolerable but slight.
Thus Philodemus had a starting point for his discussion. But Epicurus had
also left Philodemus with a problem. The interconnected activities and transformations and readiness of movement and processes of thought of the soul amount to
sensation, as Epicurus himself suggested (Ep. Hdt. 63). Is it not the case that the
separation of the soul from the body in death is an activity and a transformation,
and therefore necessarily accompanied by sensation? Granted that after death we
have no existence and therefore no sensation; even so, will we not feel something
at the very moment of death when the atoms of soul separate from the body and
are separated from each other, something that might very well be pain? On this
point Epicurus is silent, at least in his preserved works, but Philodemus’ older contemporary Demetrius Laco was at least aware of the problem.9 Lucretius (3.350–5)
affirms that sensation depends on the combination of soul and body and that the
mind and soul, like the body, can be affected by disease and healed by medicine
(3.445–525) but says nothing about the possibility that dying, the separation of
soul and body, might be painful in itself. As James Warren observes, ‘Given the
amount of time they spend discussing death, the Epicureans have surprisingly little
to say about the ethical significance of the process of dying …’10 Although Warren
includes Philodemus in this indictment, I want to suggest here that Philodemus in
fact builds on Epicurus by using contemporary scientific and medical theory to
explain the possibility that the moment of death might cause pain, and to explain
in addition why any such pain must be trivial.
Ep. Hdt. 63.
Incertarum epistularum fragmenta 44, Bailey (n. 2), 131. Cf. also Ep. Hdt. 63.10, καὶ μὴν
καὶ Óτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ.
8
A complicated issue. See Ep. Hdt. 64 with Bailey (n. 2), 228. Cf. also Lucr. 3.350–5.
9
P Herc. 1013 col. 18, quoted by Henry (n. 5), xvi.
10
J. Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics (Oxford, 2004), 13.
6
7
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ΜΕΛΗ, ΜΕΡΗ OR ΜΟΡΙΑ?
But first I must return to P Herc. 1050, col. 8, and in particular to line 9, a
place at which the most recent editor and I hold slightly different views. Pain,
Philodemus declares, is caused by the agglutination or dispersal of parts of living
creatures, τὰ μ[έρη τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων (line 9). Μέρη was proposed by Siegfried Mekler
in 1885,11 but until Henry’s path-breaking edition editors preferred to follow von
Arnim’s suggestion of 1888 and print μέλη.12 I believe that Mekler’s restoration is
correct. The chief problem with μέλη is that it makes no sense here. Plato could
use μέλη and μέρη to refer to the ‘limbs and members’ of the body (Leg. 795e),
but the words are not synonyms. Μέλη in medical or anatomical contexts are
‘limbs’ – an arm, a leg or, by metonymy, the entire body (Il. 7.131). Μέρη are
‘parts’ – of anything, but in medical contexts frequently organs like the stomach
or liver (e.g. Gal. De loc. aff. 6.8.387 Kühn, τὰ μετέωρα μέρη τῶν ἐντέρων),
structures like the thorax or abdomen, or distinct divisions of them (e.g. Arist. Hist.
an. 493a11, Θώρακος δὲ μέρη τὰ μὲν πρόσθια τὰ δ̓ ὀπίσθια). Limbs are parts,
but parts are not necessarily limbs.13 Further, an electronic search of the complete
TLG corpus for any form of μέλος within five lines of any word beginning with
πυκν- failed to produce any passage where μέλη were described as dense, closely
textured or frequent except in musical contexts, where of course individual notes
can come thick and fast (e.g. Pl. Leg. 812d). Μέρη, on the other hand, can easily
be thought of as dense or closely compacted. From many examples I give two of
a medical nature. Galen describes the way in which the upper digestive tract has
been designed so as to make it possible for us to ingest hard, large or rough items
of food. We could not do this, he says, if our digestive parts were not themselves
hard and dense: ὑφ̓ ὧν ἐθλᾶτό τ̓ ἂν καὶ κατεξύετο τὰ μέρη μὴ σκληρὰ καὶ
πυκνὰ γενόμενα (De usu partium 3.283K). Soranus (Gyn. 1.41) points out that
spring is the best season for conception. In winter, you see, bodies are dense
(πεπυκνωμένων τῶν σωμάτων) and, just like the earth, cannot easily receive seed,
and summer makes everything lax, both bodies and their reproductive parts (μέρη).
Some who prefer μέλη want the participles in the phrase ἢ πυκνούσης
ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μέλη τῶν ζῴων ἢ διϊστανούσης to mean something like ‘shrinks
and swells’ or ‘contracts and expands’ the limbs.14 But no ancient theory of disease,
as far as I know, made swelling or wasting of the limbs a distinguishing general
feature of disease. Other interpreters take πυκνούσης ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μέλη τῶν
ζῴων ἢ διϊστανούσης to mean that illness causes the limbs to contract and relax
and so to shake violently, and they adduce the descriptions of epileptic seizure at

11
S. Mekler, ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ Δ. Philodemus Ueber den Tod, viertes Buch.
SAWW 110.2, 305–54. Col. 8 is on p. 314.
12
H. von Arnim, ‘Philodemea’, RhM ser. 3, 43 (1888), 360–75; also, for example, T. Kuiper,
Philodemus Over den Dood (Amsterdam, 1925) and M. Gigante, ‘L’inizio del quarto libro ‘Della
morte’ di Filodemo’, Ricerche Filodemee 2 (Naples, 1983), 115–61.
13
See Galen, In Platonis Timaeum comentarii, fr. 2, Μέρη μὲν ὀνομάζεται πάντα τὰ
συμπληροῦντα τὸ ὅλον ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον, ἰδίως δὲ μέλη τὰ τῶν ζῴων καλεῖται
μέρη.
14
So e.g. ‘condenses or swells the limbs of living things’, D. Armstrong, ‘All things to all
men: Philodemus’ model of therapy and the audience of De morte’, in J.T. Fitzgerald, D. Obbink
and G.S. Holland (edd.), Philodemus and the New Testament World, (Leiden, 2004), 15–54, at
24.
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Lucretius 3.487–505 and Philodemus, De ira col. 8, 28–col. 9, 24 in support.15 But
at De morte col. 8, 8–10 Philodemus is talking about illness in general, and there
is no reason to specify epilepsy or any seizure disorder. None of these proposed
interpretations can account for the most likely meanings of μέρη, πυκνόω, or
διϊστάνω in an Epicurean context.
Henry believes that μέλη and μέρη are both just a little too short to fill the
space available, and he points out that τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώιων occurs frequently in
Aristotle. For these reasons he prints μόρια. He and I would agree, I think, that
while μόρια seems to be a better fit and certainly makes better sense than μέλη, it
is not possible to rule out μέρη.16 The phrase τὰ μέρη τῶν ζῴων is not unknown
in Aristotle (e.g. Gen. an. 782a, Hist. an. 532b). Inspection of digital images of
the papyrus has persuaded me that there is sufficient variation in the hand of the
scribe, particularly in his handling of the letter mu, to accommodate either μέρη
or μόρια. Certainty is impossible, but the case for μέρη becomes stronger if, as
I argue here, it allows us to make better sense of Philodemus’ argument than
μόρια. (Let me add that my conclusion, that Philodemus drew on Asclepiades for
the theory of pain that informs De morte, can be reached through the phrase ἢ
π[υ]κ[νούσ]ης ἢ διϊστανούσης even if μόρια proves to be indisputably correct.17)
WHAT ARE ΜΕΡΗ?
When Philodemus states that illness ‘lumps together or separates the particles of
living creatures’, does he mean that it lumps or separates the Epicurean atoms
of which those creatures are made? I do not think it likely that he does. Μέρος,
which appears more than 40 times in Epicurus’ writings,18 is a slippery word that
acquires its exact sense from its context. Epicurus uses μέρος to refer to a part
of Epicurean doctrine (e.g. Ep. Hdt. 35.10; 36.4; 36.11) or to a portion of some
larger structure without indication of size (e.g. τὸ μέρος τοῦτο τοῦ κόσμου, Ep.
Pyth. 112.2). At Letter to Herodotus 58 he uses it to refer to hypothetical (and in
his view, non-existent) divisions within the ‘minimum of sensation’ (τό ἐλάχιστον
τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει), the smallest perceptible magnitude in which there can be no
division into parts (διάληψιν μερῶν). He does not, however, seem to use μέρος
to refer to Epicurean atoms.
I now focus on one passage in which μέρος describes units which, while very
small, are clearly different from the atoms of which they are made. In Letter to
Pythocles 106 Epicurus describes the formation of hailstones. It illustrates, I think,
the Epicurean sense in which Philodemus uses μέρος at De Morte Book 4, col. 8:
15
e.g. von Arnim (n. 12), 363, ‘Etiam morbum, qui spasticus dicitur … cum mutatione
animae coniunctum esse apparet, cum anima corporis membra alternis contrahat atque distendat’; Gigante (n. 12), 152: ‘la forza del male scuota le membra del corpo’.
16
W. Benjamin Henry per litteras electronicas, October 28, 2009.
17
One would then argue that πυνκόω refers to aggregation of atomic or corpuscular particles,
as it does at Ep. Hdt. 62, [οἱ ἄτομοι] πυκνὸν ἀντικόπτουσιν, and διστάνω to their separation,
as at Ep. Hdt. 43, αἱ ἄτομοι … ες μακρὰν ἀπ̓ ἀλλήλων διιστάμεναι.
18
A search of the TLG corpus for all forms of μέρος in Epicurus returns 44 instances, but
in some cases (e.g. Ep. Hdt. 66.10 and 74.2) it is uncertain whether an instance should be
assigned to Epicurus or to the scholia which are embedded in the text of Diogenes Laertius’
Life of Epicurus.
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Χάλαζα συντελεῖται καὶ κατὰ πῆξιν ἰσχυροτέραν, πάντοθεν δὲ πνευματῶδων
περίστασιν τινῶν καὶ καταμέρισιν· καὶ <κατὰ> πῆξιν μετριωτέραν ὑδατοειδῶν τινῶν
<καὶ> ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν, ἅμα τήν τε σύνωσιν αὐτῶν ποιουμένην καὶ τὴν διάρρηξιν πρὸς
τὸ κατὰ μέρη συνίστασθαι πηγνύμενα καὶ κατὰ ἀθροότητα. (107) ἡ δὲ περιφέρεια
οὐκ ἀδυνάτως μὲν ἔχει γίνεσθαι πάντοθεν τῶν ἄκρων ἀποτηκομένων καὶ ἐν τῇ
συστάσει πάντοθεν, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ μέρη ὁμαλῶς περιϊσταμένων εἴτε ὑδατοειδῶν
τινων εἴτε πνευματωδῶν.19
Hail is produced both by a stronger fitting together, a crowding around from all sides and
separation of certain windy bodies, and as well by a more moderate fitting together of
certain watery bodies and their simultaneous breaking up, which creates at one and the
same time the coming-together of them and the breaking-up, as they combine by particles
(μέρη) fitting together and by organized structures. The rounded shape, possibly, can
happen as the corners melt away or in the joining from all sides, as is said, by particles
(μέρη), either of watery bodies or of windy ones, evenly crowding around.

Bailey comments, ‘The text is uncertain and the meaning obscure’.20 Lucretius
offers no illumination; if you want to know how hail and similar phenomena
happen, he says, just extrapolate from what you already know about how the basic
constituents of matter behave (6.527–34). It is clear, however, that the ‘watery
bodies’ and ‘windy bodies’ cannot be atoms, for Epicurean atoms have only three
qualities: size, weight and shape. The particles that come together κατὰ μέρη to
make rounded hailstones must be larger particles with additional qualities of windiness or wetness. Bailey (ad loc.) seems essentially right in his understanding of
κατὰ μέρη … καὶ κατὰ ἀθροότητα as describing a two-fold process in which ‘the
particles congeal, but in separate nuclei’. What Lucretius says about cloud formation
sheds additional light on what Epicurus means by μέρη here. Clouds are formed
when corpora (6.451, 484, 487) or semina aquai/aquarum (6.497, 507, 520) join
together, first into small, tenuously coherent bodies, then into small clouds, and
then into larger ones (6.451–8). Letter to Pythocles 106 establishes that the first,
post-atomic stages of this process could be called μέρη.
Epicurus himself seems not to have developed a full account of such compound,
molecular structures. In his 1896 edition of Lucretius Carlo Giussani appealed to
Letter to Herodotus 69 and 52 to argue that ὄγκος was Epicurus’ technical term
for such larger but still imperceptibly small structures.21 Giussani’s specific claim
has not won general assent,22 but the two passages on which Giussanni relied, as
well as Lucretius’ explication, make it clear that Epicureans found it necessary to
hypothesize structures with perceptible qualities compounded of atoms but at or
below the boundary of sense perception.
These ‘molecules’ help Epicureans to solve a problem arising from their fundamental postulates that only atoms and void have real existence and that atoms
have only size, shape and weight. If this is the case, we might expect bodies
19
I follow Usener and Bailey in reading <κατὰ> πῆξιν μετριωτέραν in preference to
Arrighetti’s καὶ τῆξιν. It is not clear to me what ‘a melting of watery elements’ could mean,
and Arrighetti’s translation (‘per ulteriore parziale liquefazione di alcuni elementi acquei’) seems
to beg the question; see G. Arrighetti, Epicuro: Opere (Turin, 1960), 94.
20
Bailey (n. 2), 311.
21
C. Giussani, T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, vol. 1: Studi Lucreziani (Turin,
1896), 78–84.
22
e.g. D. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton, 1967), 12. Arrighetti (n. 19),
464, however, accepts Giussani’s view.
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made of atoms to have only the qualities of their constituent elements, so that our
world would contain neither colour nor smell nor taste, but only void and bodies
of various sizes, shapes and weights. How do sensible qualities like colour arise,
and what is the nature of their existence?
Epicurean ‘molecules’, as Giussani recognized, seem to be implied by Epicurus’
discussion of this problem. In Letter to Herodotus 68–9 he considers the relationship between properties and the bodies of which they are predicated. He rules out
the possibilities that qualities exist independently of bodies, that qualities have no
existence at all, that qualities are incorporeal existences, and that they are separable parts (μόρια) of body. Instead, he says, the qualities of a body permanently
accompany it and make it what it is. A medium-sized, round, purple sphere, for
example, is such a thing because those qualities are inseparable from it, and because
we could not recognize it as such a thing if those qualities ceased to be part of it.
[sc. δοξαστέον] ἀλλ̓ ὡς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν <ἐκ> τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
φύσιν ἔχον ἀίδιον, οὐχ οἷον δ̓ εἶναι <ἐκ> συμπεφορημένων (ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν
τῶν ὄγκων μεῖζον ἄθροισμα συστῇ ἤτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν
τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων), ἀλλὰ μόνον, ὡς λέγω, ἐκ τούτων ἁπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
φύσιν ἔχον ἀίδιον.
Rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent
existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together
to form it (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which
compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it
is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them. (Bailey)

The clause in parentheses, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄγκων μεῖζον ἄθροισμα
συστῇ ἤτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων,
confirms that Epicurus imagined bodies as composed of two kinds of part: the ‘first
units of size’ (τῶν πρώτων … μεγεθῶν) and any other parts larger than these but
smaller than the whole body. These ‘first units of size’, as Bailey recognized in his
commentary on the passage, must be ‘“the first parts” or “molecules”, the minima
of sensation’ described in Letter to Herodotus 58 as the minimum perceptible
quantities (τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει). Here, as he often does, Epicurus
expects us to extrapolate from size to shape, colour, weight and other qualities
like the ones listed at the beginning of his discussion of qualities. There must be
first units of colour, shape and weight just as there are first units of size; that is,
bodies at the limit of perception, so that if they became any less red or cubical
or heavy they would cease to be perceptible as such.
These minimum perceptible qualified bodies include, I suggest, the ‘windy’
and ‘watery’ bodies of Letter to Pythocles 106: the minimum bodies that can be
perceived as having the quality of wind or water. At the same time, they are not
atoms, for atoms do not have qualities other than size, shape and weight.
Lucretius appeals to the existence of such invisible but perceptible bodies to help
possibly sceptical readers understand the reality of even smaller bodies, the atoms:
Nunc age, res quoniam docui non posse creari
de nilo neque item genitas ad nil revocari,
ne qua forte tamen coeptes diffidere dictis,
quod nequeunt oculis rerum primordia cerni,
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accipe praeterea quae corpora tute necessest
confiteare esse in rebus nec posse videri.

(1.265–70)

Come now, since I have shown that things cannot be created from nothing and that once
generated they cannot be called back to nothing, lest by chance you begin to distrust
my words because the primary constituents of matter cannot be discerned with the eyes,
understand in addition that there are bodies which you must admit exist in matter and
yet cannot be seen.

As examples of such bodies with perceptible qualities but too small to be seen he
adduces invisible bodies of wind (venti corpora caeca, 1.277, 295), scent, heat,
cold and moisture. Clothing hung by the sea, he points out, becomes moist from
what must be tiny, invisible particles of moisture: in parvas igitur partis dispergitur
umor (1.309). These partes (in Greek, μέρη) cannot be atoms, for Lucretius is using
them as evidence for the existence of atoms and they have perceptible qualities
other than size, shape and weight. They correspond to the ‘windy’ and ‘watery
bodies’ of Letter to Pythocles 106.
When Philodemus, then, speaks of τὰ μέρη τῶν ζώιων at De morte col. 8, line
9, he refers not to atoms, but to some different and perhaps more complex particle.
These particles, he states, cause sickness and pain when they become abnormally
lumped together or separated. This description, as I shall now demonstrate, fits the
ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι of Asclepiades of Bithynia and the medical theory that he developed.
ASCLEPIADES
Although many features of Asclepiades’ medical theories are unclear or controversial, both ancient sources and modern scholars agree on a few points. Asclepiades
explained physiological processes, including disease, in terms of theoretical or
non-perceptible particles, which he probably called ὄγκοι. These particles moved
through, into and out of the body through equally theoretical passages, πόροι. Some
diseases were caused by impaction of the particles and blockage of the passages;
other diseases, it seems, could be explained in a different way.
Controversy begins when we ask what our sources mean by describing
Asclepiades’ particles as ἄναρμοι, θραυστοί, fragiles, or delicati or, as one source
does, corpuscula quae solvantur. Could the ὄγκοι be broken into smaller bits? Are
we to imagine one kind of fundamental particle or two? It seems, also, that our
ancient sources are in conflict on the question of whether the particles had qualities; Sextus Empiricus affirms that Asclepiades’ elemental particles were θραυστὰ
… καὶ ποιά, ‘breakable and qualified’ (Pyr. 3.33), but Galen suggests that the
ἄναρμον of Asclepiades was ἄποιον, ‘without qualities’ (De elementis secundum
Hippocratem, 1.417 K). Caelius Aurelianus (fifth century A.D.), whose translation
of Soranus’ (second century A.D.) On Acute Diseases is our most detailed source
for Asclepiades’ doctrine, seems to agree, for he describes the corpuscula as sine
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ulla qualitate solita. Modern scholars for their part dispute Asclepiades’ intellectual
affiliations; some join Galen in grouping him with the atomists and Epicureans,23
some follow Sextus Empiricus in seeing him as a follower of Heraclides of Pontus,24
and some derive his ideas from Plato’s Timaeus, Democritus, Strato of Lampsacus
or atomists whom time has left as barely names.25 Diels, Stückelberger and recently
Vallance have seen the influence of Erasistratus.26
There is no need to resolve these controversies about Asclepiades in a short
article devoted to the interpretation of a single passage of Philodemus. Let me
make only two brief observations. First, the weight of evidence seems to me in
favour of the view that Asclepiades’ ὄγκοι were breakable (θραυστοί, fragiles, or
on at least one plausible interpretation, ἄναρμοι), and that his theory included, as
Caelius Aurelianus suggests, two kinds of elementary particle: first, fundamental
particles, ὄγκοι, which behaved in some but not all ways like Epicurean atoms;
and second, equally theoretical fragments (θραύσματα, fragmenta) into which these
ὄγκοι could be broken and from which they could be reconstituted.27 Second
(to reiterate), the idea of two kinds of theoretical particle is not incompatible
with classical Epicureanism. Thus there is no reason for Philodemus or any other
Epicurean to find Asclepiades’ medical theories uncongenial. Asclepiades was not
an Epicurean, despite tendentious attempts in antiquity to lump him with the
followers of Epicurus. Epicureans, however, would have found his materialistic
physiology sympathetic. Philodemus drew in particular on Asclepiades’ theories of
disease and of pain.
PHILODEMUS AND ASCLEPIADES ON DISEASE
Philodemus’ statement – if indeed that is what he says – that disease is a cause
of distress when it abnormally lumps together or separates the particles of living
creatures (μετ̓ ὀχλήσεως αἰτία[ς οὔση]ς ἢ πυκνούσης ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μ[έρη
τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων] ἢ διϊστανούσης, De morte col. 8.7–10) closely parallels the account
The view of, among others, J. Pigeaud, La maladie de l’âme (Paris, 1981), 141.
On Asclepiades and Heraclides, see I.M. Lonie, ‘The ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι of Heraclides of
Pontus’, Phronesis 9 (1964), 156–64, and ‘Medical theory in Heraclides of Pontus’, Mnemosyne
th
4 ser. 18 (1965), 126–43, and especially H.B. Gottschalk, Heraclides of Pontus (Oxford, 1980),
37–57. As J. Vallance, The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia (Oxford, 1990), 12 observes,
‘there are no non-doxographical references to Heraclides’ corpuscular theory which do not also
include Asclepiades’.
25
Timaeus: M. Wellmann, ‘Asklepiades aus Bithynien von einem herrschenden Vorurteil
befreit’, Neue Jahrbücher 21 (1908), 684–703. Democritus: M. Wellmann, ‘Spuren Demokrits
von Abdera im Corpus Hippocraticum’, Archeion 11 (1929), 297–330. Strato: H. Diels, ‘Über
das physikalische System des Straton’, Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie (1893), 101–27.
26
A. Stückelberger, Vestigea Democritea: Die Rezeption der Lehre von den Atomen in der
antiken Naturwissenschaft und Medizin. Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 17
(Basel, 1984), esp. 101–16; Vallance (n. 24), 123–30.
27
Caelius Aurelianus De morbis acutis 1.105: primordia namque corporis primo constituerat
[sc. Asclepiades] atomos, [secunda] corpuscula intellectu sensa sine ulla qualitate solita, atque
ex initio comitata, aeternum moventia. quae suo incursu offensa mutuis ictibus in infinita partium
fragmenta solvantur magnitudine atque schemate differentia; quae rursum eundo sibi adiecta vel
coniuncta omnia faciant sensibilia … I keep secunda or emend to secundo and follow Gottschalk
(n. 24), 56–7 in taking corpuscula as the antecedent of quae … solvantur and fragmenta as the
antecedent of quae … faciant, so that the fragmenta are identical to the atomos of the previous
clause. See also Vallance (n. 24), 18–21. I confess that I do not see what is meant by sine ulla
qualitate solita, unless it refers to sensible qualities.
23

24
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of Asclepiades’ explanation of fever given by Sextus Empiricus in the geometrical
book of his Against the Professors. Because Sextus was himself a medical man, he
is unlikely to have misunderstood Asclepiades’ theory, and because in this passage
he is simply giving an example of one kind of ὑπόθεσις used in argumentation,
he has no reason to distort the theory that he reports:
οὕτω γοῦν τρισὶν ὑποθέσεσι κεχρῆσθαί φαμεν τὸν Ασκληπιάδην εἰς κατασκευὴν τῆς
τὸν πυρετὸν ἐμποιούσης ἐνστάσεως, μιᾷ μὲν ὅτι νοητοί τινές εἰσιν ἐν ἡμῖν πόροι,
μεγέθει διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων, δευτέρᾳ δὲ ὅτι πάντοθεν ὑγροῦ μέρη καὶ πνεύματος ἐκ
λόγῳ θεωρητῶν ὄγκων συνηράνισται δι᾽ αἰῶνος ἀνηρεμήτων, τρίτῃ δὲ ὅτι ἀδιάλειπτοί
τινες εἰς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀποφοραὶ γίνονται, pot mn ple ouj ποτὲ δὲ ἐλάττους
πρὸς τὴν ἐνεστηκυῖαν περίστασιν.
So, then, we say that Asclepiades has used three ‘hypotheses’ for his demonstration of
the blockage (ἔνστασις) causing fever: first, that there are in us certain non-perceptible
pores differing from one another in size; second, that particles (μέρη) of moisture and air
are gathered from everywhere from theoretically observed and eternally moving corpuscles
(ὄγκοι); third, that certain constant emanations are sent forth from within us to the outside,
sometimes more and sometimes less according to the condition at hand.
(Math. 3.5)

Caelius Aurelianus provides some detail: Asclepiades held that severe fevers were
caused by blockage of the corpuscles; quotidian fevers, he reasoned, were caused
by blockage of large corpuscles, tertian fevers by blockage of smaller ones and
quartan fevers by blockage of the smallest (Morb. acut. 1.107–8).
In Sextus’ account of Asclepiades’ theory and in Philodemus, De morte Book
4, certain particles called μέρη are implicated in the cause of disease. Neither
Philodemus nor Asclepiades makes these μέρη the fundamental particles, atoms
or ὄγκοι, of his physical theory. In Asclepiades as reported by Sextus the μέρη
are physiological entities compounded from the fundamental particles (ἐκ λόγῳ
θεωρητῶν ὄγκων). They have sensible qualities, wetness and airiness. The parallel with Epicurus’ conjectural explanation of hail is exact. Epicurus wonders
whether hailstones arose when watery and windy bodies (ὑδατοειδῶν τινων
εἴτε πνευματωδῶν) come together from all sides (πάντοθεν) in particles (κατὰ
μέρη). Asclepiades hypothesizes that μέρη of moisture and air (ὑγροῦ μέρη καὶ
πνεύματος) come together from all sides (πάντοθεν) to create the conditions in
which fever and other diseases arise. Philodemus would have found much in
Asclepiades’ doctrine to remind him of Epicurus, and he used Asclepiades’ ideas
to defend the second leg of the tetrapharmakos against those who argued that
dying must hurt.
PHILODEMUS AND ASCLEPIADES ON PAIN
Although Philodemus found Asclepiades’ aetiology of disease congenial, it was not
his chief reason for bringing the Bithynian’s theories into Book 4 of De morte.
His primary concern was with pain, and with the question of whether severe pain
inevitably accompanied dying. His opponents had alleged that the strong bond
joining soul and body could not be dissolved without correspondingly strong pains
(ἀξιούντω[ν ἀ]δύν[ατον εἶναι] | τὴν ἀνυπέρβλητον λ[ύ]εσθαι συ[μφυΐ] | αν μὴ
μετ̓ ὀχλήσεω[ς] ἀνυπερβ[λήτου], De morte 4, P Herc. 1050 col. 8, 3–5). To
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refute them, Philodemus needed a theory of pain that would let him explain how
the Epicurean soul, a λεπτομερὲς σῶμα made up of the smallest, roundest and
smoothest of atoms, could leave the body with little or no pain. He found such
a theory in Asclepiades.
Caelius Aurelianus, supplemented by an earlier but arguably more tendentious
account in Galen, provides our most extensive report of Asclepiades’ theory of
pain. According to Caelius, Asclepiades held that pain arose from blockage of
larger corpuscles (nam dolor maiorum corpusculorum statione fiet, De morb. acut.
1.119). For this reason he refused to prescribe bloodletting in cases of phrenitis.
That disease, he believed, was likely caused by blockage of small corpuscles in
narrow pores, and thus sufferers felt no pain (phrenitici igitur nullo dolore vexantur,
siquidem angustiis in viis parvorum facta videatur statio). Asclepiades, as we have
already seen, could attribute different symptoms to the action of different sizes of
corpuscle when blockage took place (see above, p. 220).
Galen considers pain in De elementis 1.417–18 K, 486ff. K and at De constitutione artis medicae 1.248 K in the context of a larger argument about the
nature of physiological change. Galen wants to establish that physiological change
happens when the four Hippocratic elements act on one another by undergoing
change themselves or by causing change in another element. He thus wants to
show that all explanations hypothesizing either one kind of substance or unchanging
fundamental constituents like atoms fail to account for the phenomena. Pain is an
undeniable phenomenon and gives him an undeniable minor premise:
εἰ ἀπαθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς στοιχεῖον οὐκ ὀδυνηθήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀδυνᾶται·
οὐκ ἄρa ἐστιν ἀπαθές. εἰ δὲ καὶ πλείω λέγοι τις εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, μὴ μέντοι γε
ἀλλοιούμενα, καὶ ἐπ̓ ἐκείνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐρωτηθήσεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.
εἰ ἀπαθῆ τῆς σαρκός ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐκ ἀλγήσει· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀλγεῖ· οὐκ ἄρa
ἐστιν ἀπαθῆ τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς στοιχεῖα. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρότερος λόγος ἀνατρέπει τήν τε
τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνάρμων, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὑπόθεσιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν
δεύτερον ἥ τε τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν ἀναιρεῖται δόξα, καὶ ἡ Ἐμπεδοκλέους.
If the element making up flesh is impassive, it will not feel pain. But it does feel pain.
Therefore it is not impassive. Even if someone should say that the elements are several,
but not capable of change, the same argument will be posed against them in the same
way: if the elements making up flesh are impassive, they will not feel discomfort. But
they do feel discomfort. Therefore they are not impassive. The first argument overturns
the hypothesis of atoms and that of anarmoi and that of minima; the second removes the
doctrine of homoiomeries and that of Empedocles.
(De constitutione artis medicae 1.248 K)

Here Galen confirms Caelius’ testimony that the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι of Asclepiades
were involved in Asclepiades’ explanation of pain. Galen proceeds, however, to
suggest what seems to be a different account of how the anarmoi produced pain.
He asserts that mere separation and conjunction will not produce pain, because in
order for pain to occur, something must either undergo change or pass entirely out
of existence. ‘And so’, he continues, ‘the breakable anarmon of Asclepiades will
not feel pain when broken, for it is without perception’ (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄναρμον
τὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου θραυστὸν ὂν ὀδυνήσεται θραυόμενον, ἀναίσθητον γὰρ ἐστiν,
De constitutione artis medicae 1.249 K).
Galen’s remark may provide support for the idea that Asclepiades’ ὄγκοι were
breakable, but it does not support a notion that Asclepiades made pain a con-
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sequence of the dissolution of his fragile particles and not of their blockage in
theoretical passages. Galen often reaches for any stick to beat whatever dog he
has chosen as his opponent; in this case, he assigns to Asclepiades a view that
Asclepiades never held. The circumstantial testimony of Caelius Aurelianus, which
is consistent with the accounts of Sextus Empiricus and other witnesses who make
blockage and flow the foundation of Asclepiades’ nosology, gives a true picture
of Asclepiades’ theory of pain.
Philodemus, then, could ask his audience to believe something like this: disease,
as Asclepiades teaches, results from blockage of theoretical particles in theoretical passages. Blockage of larger particles causes pain; conversely, diseases like
phrenitis, in which only small particles are blocked, are not accompanied by pain.
The soul, as Epicurus teaches, is composed of tiny, smooth, round atoms. When,
therefore, these small, smooth, round atoms fly out of the body upon death, exiting
through the myriad πόροι also postulated by Asclepiades, there will be little or no
blockage, and little or no pain. Whatever there is will cease immediately when our
dying is over, and we are dead.
Our evidence does not, I think, allow us to know in detail how Philodemus
interpreted Asclepiades. He may just possibly have thought, as Galen believed
he did, that Asclepiades’ ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι were equivalent to Epicurean atoms or,
as argued here, he may have seen them as possessing qualities other than size,
weight and shape, and therefore as equivalent to minima of perception like the
windy and watery bodies that formed hailstones. Or, in a treatise addressed to an
audience of Epicureans, members of other sects, and even non-philosophers,28 he
may have wanted to finesse technical issues in atomistic theory. If so, then μέρη
was a good word to choose. For Philodemus, Asclepiades’ theory of pain offered
a way to ground his argument that separation of soul and body was painless, or at
worst accompanied by only slight and bearable pain, in a widely accepted medical
theory of his day. As Elizabeth Rawson observes, there may have been ‘no intellectual figure at work in Rome in the period of the late Republic who had more
originality and influence than the Bithynian doctor Asclepiades’.29
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